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Reducing Our Prison Population:  
Past Failures and New Approaches 
Juan Marcellus Tauri1 
Background 
The following commentary is based on speaking notes from a University of 
Waikato public lecture given by the author in Tauranga, New Zealand on 5th 
of December 2018. 
Introduction 
Earlier this year the Minister of Justice, Andrew Little announced the latest 
in a long line of reviews, taxpayer-funded summits and inter-agency, ‘whole-
of-government’ projects stretching back to the late-1980s, all aimed in some 
form or other, at making the criminal justice system more ‘safe’ and ‘effective’. 
Officially launched at a summit held in Porirua in August 2018, the aim of 
the latest review is to reduce New Zealand’s prison muster by 30% over the 
next 15 years. And unsurprisingly, given our significant over-representation 
in prisons, a specific focus of the review is on identifying ways to significantly 
reduce Māori over-representation in the prison population. This commentary 
represents a modest offering in response to the current government’s stated 
aim of making the justice system safer and more effective, and to reduce the 
prison muster, and it is based on two core arguments, namely that 
successive governments and the public service have failed to reduce 
offending and imprisonment and that successful solutions require 
community empowerment and government/public service accountability. 
For decades the policy sector, in support of the political class, has led 
the development and implementation of responses to crime in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. And the impact of their crime control activity has been mixed at 
best, with as many failures (if not more) as successes. However, regardless 
of the many failures, the over-reliance on importing crime control policies 
from high-crime jurisdictions and the Eurocentric bias of its policy 
                                                          
1 The University of Waikato, New Zealand 
 





development processes, reform of the policy sector, and the political context 
of crime control policy are essential if Minister Little and the Coalition 
government is to meet its target of 30%. 
Any attempt to reduce the prison population requires a significant 
increase in the role of communities, especially service providers, in the 
development of responses to social harm. This process must be presaged 
with a reduction of the authority of the political class and public service in 
the development of crime control policy and a significant increase in their 
accountability to the taxpayer.  
Case studies will be used throughout the commentary to highlight 
some of the reasons why the political class and public service have failed to 
reduce New Zealand’s rate of imprisonment, especially of Māori. They are 
also used to support the argument that a meaningful reduction in the 
country’s prison muster requires a significant overhaul of the policy sectors 
policy process, a necessary reduction in the influence of moral entrepreneurs 
such as the Sensible Sentencing Trust, and the political class’s use of crime 
control as a means of creating fear, and votes, across the community. 
Catastrophic Failure and Crime Control Policy in New Zealand 
Case Study 1 – The Department of Corrections Integrated Offender 
Management Programme 
When the author arrived at the then Department of Corrections in early 2001, 
officials were rolling out Integrated Offender Management (IOM). Imported 
more-or-less wholesale from Canada, IOM was, in theory at least, designed 
to streamline management of inmates’ custodial sentences. In particular, it 
was meant to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of interventions to 
offenders that matched their identified ‘criminogenic needs’, those key 
drivers of their offending (according to the underlying theoretical framework 
known as the Psychology of Criminal Conduct) such as alcohol and drug 
dependency, anger management issues and cognitive impairment. Although 
touted as a new, scientific, empirically based response to offending, the 
importation and implementation of IOM provides a case study that 
encapsulates significant issues with the development of crime control policy 
in New Zealand, including: 
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The Superficiality of Public Service Consultation 
It was evident during both the policy development and implementation 
phases that senior management at Corrections was hell-bent in introducing 
the process despite a lack of evidence of efficacy of either the policies or 
criminogenic interventions (their suitability) for the New Zealand context, or 
dissenting views from staff and/or the public, especially from Māori. The 
‘implementation at any cost’ ethos was most apparent in the internal and 
external ‘consultation’ exercises carried out by designated officials, called 
the ‘IOM Champions’. The author was present at a number of consultations 
with staff and community members; overall the exercises were superficial, 
tick-the-box exercises where the concerns of participants were re-written in 
a final report to suit the pre-determined policy parameters of IOM or ignored 
altogether. And in some instances, despite assurances that staff could speak 
confidentially during internal consultation, staff who asked critical 
questions of IOM were reported to their managers who ‘corrected’ their 
behaviour.  
Orientalisation of Crime Control Policy Responses 
The importation and implementation of IOM by the department involved a 
liberal use of what Harry Blagg (via Edward Said) called the orientalisation 
of the crime control policy context. The process of orientalisation in crime 
control, as described by Blagg, refers to the strategy of dismissing criticisms 
of the cultural appropriateness of interventions, by drawing comparisons 
between disparate groups, in this case Black Canadians (for whom it was 
claimed IOM ‘worked’) and Māori, and arguing because it ‘worked’ for Black 
Canadians then it would work for Māori. The basis of this claim being that 
both groups were minorities and over-represented (and implicitly because 
both are ‘coloured’). Missing from this argument was any evidenced analysis 
of the vastly different historical, socio-economic and intersectional drivers of 
the marginalised status of both communities. Orientalised comments were 
often used by the ‘IOM Champions’ (yes, an actual position!) within 
Corrections, when responding to concerns expressed by Maori staff within 
the department and external officials from Te Puni Kokiri, about the 
effectiveness of IOM for responding to the specific needs of Maori 
 
. 





The Mythology of Evidence-Based Policy Processes 
The IOM case study problematizes claims by the crime control sector that 
follows the principles of evidence-based policymaking when developing 
policies and interventions. A few years after the implementation of IOM and 
its suite of criminogenic interventions, time came for the analysis and release 
of the first tranche of outcome-based data, meaning the impact of the 
programmes on recidivism. The results were not what the Department had 
predicted. For some interventions, such as the cognitive programme Straight 
Thinking, Māori who did not attend had lower recidivism rates than those 
who did. The report was suddenly taken from the primary author to be 
‘edited’, due to the poor results of the programmes in terms of impact on 
recidivism.   
Despite evidence that the programmes, especially Straight Thinking, 
were not reducing offending, there was no consideration by the Department 
to cease using the interventions or significantly overhauling them. Officials 
responded to the poor outcome of their criminogenic programmes by 
claiming that all that was required was a little ‘tweaking’ to ensure their 
efficacy. Not long after the Department used the results of formative 
evaluations on community-centred programmes, as the basis of a decision 
to cease funding some. The same ‘standard’ of outcomes and impact was not 
applied to their own programmes. 
Such behaviour is not uncommon in other agencies. The lessons from 
this example include firstly, agencies will use ‘evidence’ of effectiveness from 
programmes implemented in other jurisdictions, ignoring the impact of ‘local 
conditions’, and secondly, when evidence of programmatic failure arises, as 
it did with the IOM-related interventions in the mid-2000s, the sector applies 
quite different rules when considering continued support and funding for its 
favoured programmes in comparison to community-centred initiatives.  
The implementation of IOM highlights several failings across New 
Zealand’s criminal justice sector, explaining the low impact it has on crime 
rates and for reducing the prison muster, namely: 
1. The sectors reliance on importing crime control policies and 
interventions from other high-crime, Western jurisdictions at the 
expense of home-grown solutions. 
2. Retrofitting crime control policies and processes to the New Zealand 
context without the requisite engagement and research work required 
to ensure they ‘fit’ the New Zealand context. 
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3. An aversion by the major criminal justice agencies to admit mistakes 
and release information that does not portray them in a good light. 
4. And finally, an unwillingness, or inability to trust ‘the community’ to 
take the lead in the developing and delivering effective responses to 
social harm. 
The rise of IOM coincided with a revolution within many of the crime 
control agencies wherein ‘science’ and ‘evidence’ became the basis of 
policymaking, the development of interventions, and allocation of resources. 
At least that is what the policy sector told itself and the public from the early 
2000s onwards in numerous policy statements, annual reports and such 
like. Quite often this was not the case, with pertinent evidence being totally 
ignored or the evidence that suits a predetermined policy outcome favoured 
over the messy stuff, like evidence that contradicts a Cabinet Minister’s pet 
project, or that highlights the negative impact of government’s social and 
economic policy. 
 
Case Study – Boot Camps 
A recent example of policy implementation that ignored available evidence 
was the previous National government’s (2008-2017) decision to introduce 
boot camps as a response to youth offending. At the time of implementation, 
no firm evidence existed that the intervention would result in positive 
outcomes for youth, but it was implemented regardless.  
To understand how such a poorly performing crime control 
intervention could be introduced, one need to critique the oft-repeated 
claims that New Zealand’s policy sector is apolitical (as in neutral) and policy 
decisions are based on scientifically derived evidence. This is often not the 
case in the crime control policy sector. The introduction of boot camps was 
purely ideological and political, a result of the political classes preference for 
the vote-winning ‘tough on crime’ approach to social harm. A nod to the ‘a 
good thrashing never did me any harm’ approach to crime control popular 
amongst radio shock jocks and other moral entrepreneurs.   
To their credit, at the time Cabinet was considering the policy options 
for the camps, Ministry of Justice officials provided their Minister with a 
thorough written briefing that highlighted the lack of evidence that the 
intervention would, in fact, reduce youth offending. The Minister moved 
forward with the policy, simply noting that he had ‘received, but not read’ 
the briefing. Let me repeat that, he had received but not read the briefing. I 
will come back to this ‘attitude’ soon. 





I wish to be clear about one thing, sometimes evidence plays a 
significant role in policy development and implementation. My argument 
here is that sometimes it does not. The policy process can be, and often is, 
highly political and ideological, with interventions and policies influenced as 
much by who a Minister was drinking with last week, as it is on independent, 
empirical evidence. 
Through this case study, we see the impact on crime control policy, of 
political ideology, of the need to secure votes, resulting in taxpayer’s money 
being squandered on a failed intervention. Through this example, we 
observed political decisions being made in the face of overwhelming evidence 
that contradicts the political and ideological rationale offered by government. 
But it is not only the political class that is guilty of what is best described as 
policy-based evidence, as opposed to evidence-based policy, which can be 
defined as: Crime control policy based on the ideological and theoretical bias 
of the Policy Industry and politicians. 
What is the Crux of the Problem? The Policy Bubble! 
There are several issues/factors that play a role in the overall poor quality 
of policies and interventions produced by the Policy Industry. Combined they 
result in what I refer to as the Policy Bubble, a thin, protective rhetorical veil 
that results in officials making exaggerated claims of success in the face of 
the inevitable, catastrophic failure of existing or new policies and interventions. 
How exactly does the bubble manifest in the policy context that is 
supposedly ‘scientific’ and politically neutral? Through planned, purposeful 
build-up of pressure relating to moral panic and political rhetoric relating to 
a particular social harm and/or a particularly problematic population (such 
as Māori or refugees). Supported by the utilisation of managerialist policy 
development tools underpinned by core procedural concepts (which are in 
fact meaningless rhetorical devices) like ‘international best practice’, 
‘evidence-based policy’ and ‘scientific interventions’. Underpinned by the 
cherry-picking of empirical evidence by policy workers to support 
preconceived, politically driven policy, resourcing and legislative decisions. 
All this activity is carried out with the full knowledge of the Policy Industry 
that the efficacy of said policies and interventions will have little positive 
impact on the crime rate and prison muster, especially for Māori – the 
exaggeration of its impact is intentional. 
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Bursting the Bubble 
Catastrophic policy failure occurs in New Zealand’s crime control policy 
sector because of: 
• an over-reliance on importation of interventions ill-suited to the Aotearoa 
New Zealand social context; 
• the a-cultural, a-theoretical nature of policymaking that results in 
policies and interventions ill-suited to Māori and Pasifika peoples; 
• a public service focused on ‘political service’ rather than serving the crime 
control needs of communities, and 
• ignorance of contemporary lived experience/social context of Māori and 
‘other’ communities and focus on ‘consultation’ rather than meaningful 
engagement. 
And perhaps more importantly:  
• exaggerated claims of policy efficacy are made in the face of inevitable, 
catastrophic failure because of the political nature of policymaking, and 
because policy development is about control and manipulation of 
individuals and populations and not the reduction of social harm. 
Strategies for Reducing the Prison Population 
In the last section of this commentary, several policy and ‘political’ responses 
will be offered that could assist Minister Little and his officials to reduce the 
prison muster but more importantly ensure that the reduction is sustainable 
over time. 
Response One – Depoliticise Crime Control Policy 
The first response appears on paper the easiest to implement, but, in fact, 
is probably the most difficult because it requires the political class to put 
aside their commitment to set ideological positions on crime control. Quite 
simply, New Zealand needs to depoliticise crime control policy similar to how 
Finland has done. We need a cross-party agreement to stop the nonsense 
where every three years politicians try to outdo each other to see who can 
appear the ‘toughest on crime’, promising (and often delivering) significant 
increases in police numbers (with the usual unrealised promises of 
reductions in crime), more prison beds, longer sentences, and so forth. This 
has been the standard political response to crime in New Zealand for the 
best part of three decades: has it made us safer, or, more accurately, to ‘feel’ 
safer? The answer is no. The way forward is to develop a policy process 





based on the needs of community, and one less concerned with the ballot 
box needs of politicians.  
Response Two – Get Over the Policy Cringe 
Those who work with victims and offenders invariably know what is needed 
to respond meaningfully to the issues that arise from social harm. We need 
the policy sector to work with both providers and communities more directly 
(and respectfully), to work with them as partners to develop effective, socially 
grounded programmes. In order to achieve this, we need to get over the 
policy cringe that too often afflicts the crime control policy sector.   
Much like the cultural cringe, the policy cringe is based on the 
erroneous belief that ‘things are done better elsewhere’ and that successful 
responses to social harm must be imported from other jurisdictions, usually 
from jurisdictions with high crime rates! And so, we import crime control 
policies from other jurisdictions, invariably do little to alter them for the New 
Zealand context, and then place them over the top of community-centred 
practice... and watch them crash and burn. The classic example of this 
process was the importation to New Zealand in the mid-2000s of Multi-
Systemic Therapy (MST) from the US as` part of the new youth residential 
programme that was trialled in Hamilton. Officials from several agencies, 
including Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Māori Development) stated serious 
concerns at the suitability of the programme for Māori youth; concerns that 
were ignored. The result? The programme, MST especially, failed to respond 
to the needs of youth offenders, especially Māori, while – at the same time – 
a number of existing home-grown wrap-around, social support programmes 
for Māori youth, were ignored.  
Response Three – Treatment and Social Support, Not Criminalisation and 
Imprisonment 
There is a simple response that will reduce the prison population quickly 
and enable Minister Little to meet his 30% objective… stop sending people 
to prison. Stop arresting people, charging them, sending them to court, 
sentencing them to imprisonment for victimless crimes, low-level drug 
offences, and so-called ‘administrative crimes’ and non-payment of fines. 
Stop sending people to prison who are addicted to drugs and alcohol, as well 
as those who have mental health issues. Instead, put more resources into 
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social support and treatment and increase significantly the use of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. 
And here is a suggestion that will likely anger some, and that is for 
the policy sector and the wider community to recognise the reality we are 
dealing with regarding our prison muster: a significant number of them are 
addicted, are mentally unwell, and many have long histories of trauma, in 
particular, domestic violence and sexual victimisation. If we want to stop 
them victimising others, we need to work with them so they can deal with 
their own trauma.   
Alluding to the trauma of offenders is unpopular for some and brings 
forth comments like ‘you are making excuses for serious crime’: no, I am 
not. I am highlighting a reality that we need to deal with if we are to create 
a safer, more just society. It is an explanation of their behaviour and not a 
reason to ignore the harm they have caused others. 
  
Response Four – Let Us In! 
The crime control sector needs to grow up and become less concerned with 
image politics. It needs to stop being so risk-averse and allow independent 
researchers to undertake critical, independent research on all aspects of the 
criminal justice system. The principal crime control agencies have, for some 
time now, been making it very difficult for independent, critical researchers 
to scrutinise the performance of the ‘system’.  
We are talking here about the strategy, that a number of justice sector 
representatives have followed the past few years, of blocking research that 
does not suit their needs or could possibly result in critical analysis of their 
performance. And it is blocking independent researchers from going about 
their business, by using excuses like ‘the information that will be gathered 
doesn’t match with our trending data’ or ‘with the Department’s strategic 
priorities’. And if that fails, Corrections, New Zealand Police and the Ministry 
of Justice fall back on well-worn excuses such as potential ‘safety’ issues for 
both inmates and researchers.   
And yet other comparable jurisdictions, most notably the United 
Kingdom and Australia, regularly allow researchers to enter prisons to carry 
out independent work or engage in research with justice ‘clients’ to an extent 
not seen in the New Zealand context. The evidence for this is the significant 
amount (comparatively speaking) of independent research materials 
published in academic journals on prisons and corrections policies in that 
and other comparable jurisdictions. The problem in the New Zealand context 





seems to grow from the intersection – a dangerous combination – of three 
factors: 1) a policy elite who appear to believe themselves beyond critique, 2) 
a policy elite who believe they are not answerable to the public, and 3) a 
policy elite supported by a political elite who share the same aversion to 
independent scrutiny.   
Let me be even more frank, policy workers and government agencies 
do not always have the answers and, more importantly, because they are so 
close to their own work, they often can’t see the wood for the trees. In other 
words, it is sometimes difficult for them to step back and critically analyse 
the impact or their work or identify the questions that need to be asked of 
the performance of the criminal justice system. Sometimes the questions 
and topics ‘the community’, which includes independent researchers, 
inmates, ex-inmates, inmates and ex-inmates’ families, victims and service 
providers, believe are important will not match those of the policy sector. 
And sometimes the questions that are important to these individuals and 
groups are the right ones to be asking, the right ones to be researching. It is 
essential to remember, a government agency is part of the public service and 
derives its resources from the public purse. Therefore, it is time for policy 
practitioners to stop acting as though they are not answerable to the public. 
Response Five – Admit that Bias and Racism Exist in the Criminal Justice 
System 
The recent claim by the Police Commissioner that there is no racism in the 
police, that some officers have ‘unconscious bias’ is nothing more than a 
political ruse designed to ignore the fact that racism exists in the New 
Zealand police force, as it does in many other jurisdictions. The existence of 
racism and bias in police and other criminal justice institutions across 
Western jurisdictions is well-evidenced, including jurisdictions that we 
regularly compare ourselves to, such as Great Britain and Australia. What 
makes the Commissioner and his supporters believe our force is any 
different? Perhaps it is because they continue to believe in the myth that 
New Zealand has the best race relations in the world? Bias exists in our 
criminal justice system, and despite the best attempts to block independent 
research that I spoke of earlier, we do have empirical evidence that 
demonstrates its existence, starting with Moana Jackson’s 1988 report, two 
MRL Research Group attitudinal surveys in the 1990s, Roguski and Te 
Whaiti’s Police Perceptions of Māori research published in 2000, and most 
recently, research by the Otago School of Medicine (published in 2018). 
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If Māori are to take up the challenge to do more, as we should, then 
just as importantly, crime control institutions and the policy sector in New 
Zealand need to be more open and honest about the bias and racism that 
exists in our institutions and do something concrete about these issues. And 
if they do, perhaps then, together, we can change the landscape of criminal 
justice in this country, and Minister Little can meet his 30% target.  
 
